Sesame it Jizo NDR
Overview
Sesame it Jizo NDR is a network observability platform that enables decision-makers to anticipate, identify and block cyber-attacks.
- Vendor: Sesame
- Supported environment: Cloud
- Detection based on: Alert
Warning
Important note - This format is currently in beta. We highly value your feedback to improve its performance.
Configure
In this guide, you will configure the Jizo NDR to forward events to syslog.
Prerequisites
An internal syslog concentrator is required to collect and forward events to Sekoia.io.
Configure log settings
- Log into jizo console
- Configure Syslog Primary to receive alerts Logs
syslog_conf set <log concentrator server ip> <PROTOCOL> <log concentrator port> 2
with
Create the intake
Go to the intake page and create a new intake from the format Sesame it Jizo NDR.
Forward logs to Sekoia.io
Please consult the Syslog Forwarding documentation to forward these logs to Sekoia.io.
Raw Events Samples
In this section, you will find examples of raw logs as generated natively by the source. These examples are provided to help integrators understand the data format before ingestion into Sekoia.io. It is crucial for setting up the correct parsing stages and ensuring that all relevant information is captured.
{
"timestamp": "2024-06-27T12:56:49.920281+0000",
"flow_id": 1017644745558273,
"in_iface": "icc1",
"event_type": "alert",
"src_ip": "1.2.3.4",
"src_port": 8000,
"dest_ip": "10.0.4.4",
"dest_port": 4000,
"proto": "TCP",
"alert": {
"action": "allowed",
"gid": 1,
"signature_id": 2221014,
"rev": 1,
"signature": "ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE Probe MS17-010 (Generic Flags)",
"category": "A Network Trojan was detected",
"severity": 3,
"metadata": {
"affected_product": [
"machine1"
],
"attack_target": [
"Client_Endpoint"
],
"signature_severity": [
"Major"
]
}
},
"app_proto": "smb",
"flow": {
"pkts_toserver": 4,
"pkts_toclient": 4,
"bytes_toserver": 265,
"bytes_toclient": 701,
"start": "2024-01-07T19:54:41.492407+0000"
}
}
{
"timestamp": "2024-06-27T13:25:18.431133+0000",
"flow_id": 1017644745558273,
"in_iface": "icc1",
"event_type": "alert",
"src_ip": "10.20.30.101",
"src_port": 49778,
"dest_ip": "203.176.135.102",
"dest_port": 8082,
"proto": "TCP",
"http": {
"http_port": 8082,
"url": "/libhtp::request_uri_not_seen",
"http_server_agent": "KSKJJGJ",
"http_content_type": "text/plain",
"status": 200,
"response_length": 3,
"request_length": 0
},
"app_proto": "http",
"flow": {
"pkts_toserver": 8,
"pkts_toclient": 7,
"bytes_toserver": 5427,
"bytes_toclient": 502,
"start": "2024-06-27T13:11:21.595110+0000"
},
"alert": {
"action": "allowed",
"gid": 1,
"signature_id": 2100494,
"rev": 12,
"signature": "GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE command completed",
"category": "Potentially Bad Traffic",
"severity": 2,
"metadata": {
"updated_at": [
"2010_09_23"
],
"created_at": [
"2010_09_23"
]
}
}
}
{
"timestamp": "2024-06-27T12:56:49.920281+0000",
"flow_id": 1017644745558273,
"in_iface": "icc1",
"event_type": "alert",
"src_ip": "1.2.3.4",
"src_port": 8000,
"dest_ip": "10.0.4.4",
"dest_port": 4000,
"proto": "TCP",
"alert": {
"action": "allowed",
"gid": 1,
"signature_id": 2221014,
"rev": 1,
"signature": "ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE Probe MS17-010 (Generic Flags)",
"category": "A Network Trojan was detected",
"severity": 3,
"metadata": {
"affected_product": [
"machine1"
],
"attack_target": [
"Client_Endpoint"
],
"signature_severity": [
"Major"
]
}
},
"app_proto": "smb",
"flow": {
"pkts_toserver": 4,
"pkts_toclient": 4,
"bytes_toserver": 265,
"bytes_toclient": 701,
"start": "2024-01-07T19:54:41.492407+0000"
}
}
Detection section
The following section provides information for those who wish to learn more about the detection capabilities enabled by collecting this intake. It includes details about the built-in rule catalog, event categories, and ECS fields extracted from raw events. This is essential for users aiming to create custom detection rules, perform hunting activities, or pivot in the events page.
Related Built-in Rules
The following Sekoia.io built-in rules match the intake Sesame it Jizo NDR [BETA]. This documentation is updated automatically and is based solely on the fields used by the intake which are checked against our rules. This means that some rules will be listed but might not be relevant with the intake.
SEKOIA.IO x Sesame it Jizo NDR [BETA] on ATT&CK Navigator
Alert High Severity Sesame it Jizo NDR
Detects a high severity alert raised by SesameIT.
- Effort: master
Burp Suite Tool Detected
Burp Suite is a cybersecurity tool. When used as a proxy service, its purpose is to intercept packets and modify them to send them to the server. Burp Collaborator is a network service that Burp Suite uses to help discover many kinds of vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities scanner).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure Exploit
Detects the successful exploitation of the Pulse Secure vulnerability CVE-2019-11510. This CVE is one of the most exploited CVEs since 2019. It is exploited by diverse threat actors, leading sometimes in ransomware deployement among these groups: Maze, Conti, Egregor, DoppelPaymer, NetWalker and REvil. But also APT actors such as APT29. The exploitation of this CVE allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to compromise a vulnerable VPN server. The attacker may be able to gain access to all active users and their plain-text credentials. It may also be possible for the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on each VPN client as it successfully connects to the VPN server. The exploit reads /etc/passwd file to get access to login and passwords in (clear/text). An HTTP response status code = 200, means the file was successfully accessed. This vulnerability affects 8.1R15.1, 8.2 before 8.2R12.1, 8.3 before 8.3R7.1, and 9.0 before 9.0R3.4 products.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-19781 Citrix NetScaler (ADC)
Detects CVE-2019-19781 exploitation attempt against Citrix NetScaler (ADC), Application Delivery Controller and Citrix Gateway Attack.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2019-2725 Oracle Weblogic Exploit
Detects the successful exploitation of a deserialization vulnerability in Oracle Weblogic Server, CVE-2019-2725. This vulnerability affects versions 10.X and 12.1.3 of WebLogic that have the components wls9_async_response.war and wls-wsat.war enabled. It is a remote code execution which can be exploited without authentication via HTTP. An HTTP response status code = 202, means the target is vulnerable, the analyst then has to look in depth to check if a webshell has been uploaded or something else has been done.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-0688 Microsoft Exchange Server Exploit
Detects the exploitation of CVE-2020-0688. The POC exploit a .NET serialization vulnerability in the Exchange Control Panel (ECP) web page. The vulnerability is due to Microsoft Exchange Server not randomizing the keys on a per-installation basis resulting in them using the same validationKey and decryptionKey values. With knowledge of these, values an attacker can craft a special viewstate to use an OS command to be executed by NT_AUTHORITY\SYSTEM using .NET deserialization. To exploit this vulnerability, an attacker needs to leverage the credentials of an account it had already compromised to authenticate to OWA.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2020-17530 Apache Struts RCE
Detects the exploitation of the Apache Struts RCE vulnerability (CVE-2020-17530).
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2020-5902 F5 BIG-IP Exploitation Attempts
Detects the exploitation attempt of the vulnerability found in F5 BIG-IP and described in CVE-2020-5902.
- Effort: elementary
CVE-2021-20021 SonicWall Unauthenticated Administrator Access
Detects the exploitation of SonicWall Unauthenticated Admin Access.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-20023 SonicWall Arbitrary File Read
Detects Arbitrary File Read, which can be used with other vulnerabilities as a mean to obtain outputs generated by attackers, or sensitive data.
- Effort: advanced
CVE-2021-22893 Pulse Connect Secure RCE Vulnerability
Detects potential exploitation of the authentication by-pass vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated user to perform remote arbitrary file execution on the Pulse Connect Secure gateway. It is highly recommended to apply the Pulse Secure mitigations and seach for indicators of compromise on affected servers if you are in doubt over the integrity of your Pulse Connect Secure product.
- Effort: intermediate
CVE-2021-43798 Grafana Directory Traversal
Grafana version 8.x has a 0day arbitrary file read (with no fix yet) based on a directory traversal vulnerability
- Effort: intermediate
Cryptomining
Detection of domain names potentially related to cryptomining activities.
- Effort: master
Detect requests to Konni C2 servers
This rule detects requests to Konni C2 servers. These patterns come from an analysis done in 2022, September.
- Effort: elementary
Discord Suspicious Download
Discord is a messaging application. It allows users to create their own communities to share messages and attachments. Those attachments have little to no overview and can be downloaded by almost anyone, which has been abused by attackers to host malicious payloads.
- Effort: intermediate
Download Files From Suspicious TLDs
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
- Effort: master
Dynamic DNS Contacted
Detect communication with dynamic dns domain. This kind of domain is often used by attackers. This rule can trigger false positive in non-controlled environment because dynamic dns is not always malicious.
- Effort: master
Exfiltration Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a possible exfiltration vector.
- Effort: master
Internet Scanner
Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP. This could be a very noisy rule, so be careful to check your detection perimeter before activation.
- Effort: master
Internet Scanner Target
Detects known scanner IP addresses. Alert is only raised when the scan hits an opened port, on TCP or UDP and group by target address. This could be a very noisy rule, so be careful to check your detection perimeter before activation.
- Effort: master
Koadic MSHTML Command
Detects Koadic payload using MSHTML module
- Effort: intermediate
LokiBot Default C2 URL
Detects default C2 URL for trojan LokiBot
- Effort: elementary
Possible Malicious File Double Extension
Detects request to potential malicious file with double extension
- Effort: elementary
ProxyShell Microsoft Exchange Suspicious Paths
Detects suspicious calls to Microsoft Exchange resources, in locations related to webshells observed in campaigns using this vulnerability.
- Effort: elementary
Raccoon Stealer 2.0 Legitimate Third-Party DLL Download URL
Detects Raccoon Stealer 2.0 malware downloading legitimate third-party DLLs from its C2 server. These legitimate DLLs are used by the information stealer to collect data on the compromised hosts.
- Effort: elementary
Remote Access Tool Domain
Detects traffic toward a domain flagged as a Remote Administration Tool (RAT).
- Effort: master
Remote Monitoring and Management Software - AnyDesk
Detect artifacts related to the installation or execution of the Remote Monitoring and Management tool AnyDesk.
- Effort: master
SEKOIA.IO Intelligence Feed
Detect threats based on indicators of compromise (IOCs) collected by SEKOIA's Threat and Detection Research team.
- Effort: elementary
Sekoia.io EICAR Detection
Detects observables in Sekoia.io CTI tagged as EICAR, which are fake samples meant to test detection.
- Effort: master
Suspicious Download Links From Legitimate Services
Detects users clicking on Google docs links to download suspicious files. This technique was used a lot by Bazar Loader in the past.
- Effort: intermediate
Suspicious TOR Gateway
Detects suspicious TOR gateways. Gateways are often used by the victim to pay and decrypt the encrypted files without installing TOR. Tor intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: advanced
Suspicious URI Used In A Lazarus Campaign
Detects suspicious requests to a specific URI, usually on an .asp page. The website is often compromised.
- Effort: intermediate
TOR Usage
Detects TOR usage, based on the IP address and the destination port (filtered on NTP). TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
TOR Usage Generic Rule
Detects TOR usage globally, whether the IP is a destination or source. TOR is short for The Onion Router, and it gets its name from how it works. TOR intercepts the network traffic from one or more apps on user’s computer, usually the user web browser, and shuffles it through a number of randomly-chosen computers before passing it on to its destination. This disguises user location, and makes it harder for servers to pick him/her out on repeat visits, or to tie together separate visits to different sites, this making tracking and surveillance more difficult. Before a network packet starts its journey, user’s computer chooses a random list of relays and repeatedly encrypts the data in multiple layers, like an onion. Each relay knows only enough to strip off the outermost layer of encryption, before passing what’s left on to the next relay in the list.
- Effort: master
Event Categories
The following table lists the data source offered by this integration.
| Data Source | Description |
|---|---|
Network intrusion detection system |
Jizo identify suspicious behaviors by providing alerts logs |
Network device logs |
The logs provided by jizo give a good overview of the network activity |
Network protocol analysis |
The logs offered by jizo provide traffic analysis |
In details, the following table denotes the type of events produced by this integration.
| Name | Values |
|---|---|
| Kind | alert |
| Category | network |
| Type | connection |
Transformed Events Samples after Ingestion
This section demonstrates how the raw logs will be transformed by our parsers. It shows the extracted fields that will be available for use in the built-in detection rules and hunting activities in the events page. Understanding these transformations is essential for analysts to create effective detection mechanisms with custom detection rules and to leverage the full potential of the collected data.
{
"message": " {\"timestamp\":\"2024-06-27T12:56:49.920281+0000\",\"flow_id\":1017644745558273,\"in_iface\":\"icc1\",\"event_type\":\"alert\",\"src_ip\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"src_port\":8000,\"dest_ip\":\"10.0.4.4\",\"dest_port\":4000,\"proto\":\"TCP\",\"alert\":{\"action\":\"allowed\",\"gid\":1,\"signature_id\":2221014,\"rev\":1,\"signature\":\"ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE Probe MS17-010 (Generic Flags)\",\"category\":\"A Network Trojan was detected\",\"severity\":3,\"metadata\":{\"affected_product\":[\"machine1\"],\"attack_target\":[\"Client_Endpoint\"],\"signature_severity\":[\"Major\"]}},\"app_proto\":\"smb\",\"flow\":{\"pkts_toserver\":4,\"pkts_toclient\":4,\"bytes_toserver\":265,\"bytes_toclient\":701,\"start\":\"2024-01-07T19:54:41.492407+0000\"}}",
"event": {
"action": "allowed",
"category": [
"network"
],
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"start": "2024-01-07T19:54:41.492407Z",
"type": [
"connection"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2024-06-27T12:56:49.920281Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"category": "A Network Trojan was detected",
"severity": "Major",
"signature": "ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE Probe MS17-010 (Generic Flags)",
"signature_id": "2221014"
}
},
"destination": {
"address": "10.0.4.4",
"bytes": 701,
"ip": "10.0.4.4",
"packets": 4,
"port": 4000
},
"host": {
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"jizo": {
"flow": {
"id": "1017644745558273"
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "smb",
"transport": "TCP"
},
"observer": {
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "icc1"
}
}
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"10.0.4.4"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"bytes": 265,
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"packets": 4,
"port": 8000
}
}
{
"message": "{\"timestamp\":\"2024-06-27T13:25:18.431133+0000\",\"flow_id\":1017644745558273,\"in_iface\":\"icc1\",\"event_type\":\"alert\",\"src_ip\":\"10.20.30.101\",\"src_port\":49778,\"dest_ip\":\"203.176.135.102\",\"dest_port\":8082,\"proto\":\"TCP\",\"http\":{\"http_port\":8082,\"url\":\"/libhtp::request_uri_not_seen\",\"http_server_agent\":\"KSKJJGJ\",\"http_content_type\":\"text/plain\",\"status\":200,\"response_length\":3,\"request_length\":0},\"app_proto\":\"http\",\"flow\":{\"pkts_toserver\":8,\"pkts_toclient\":7,\"bytes_toserver\":5427,\"bytes_toclient\":502,\"start\":\"2024-06-27T13:11:21.595110+0000\"},\"alert\":{\"action\":\"allowed\",\"gid\":1,\"signature_id\":2100494,\"rev\":12,\"signature\":\"GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE command completed\",\"category\":\"Potentially Bad Traffic\",\"severity\":2,\"metadata\":{\"updated_at\":[\"2010_09_23\"],\"created_at\":[\"2010_09_23\"]}}}",
"event": {
"action": "allowed",
"category": [
"network"
],
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 2,
"start": "2024-06-27T13:11:21.595110Z",
"type": [
"connection"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2024-06-27T13:25:18.431133Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"category": "Potentially Bad Traffic",
"signature": "GPL ATTACK_RESPONSE command completed",
"signature_id": "2100494"
}
},
"destination": {
"address": "203.176.135.102",
"bytes": 502,
"ip": "203.176.135.102",
"packets": 7,
"port": 8082
},
"host": {
"ip": "10.20.30.101"
},
"http": {
"response": {
"bytes": 3,
"status_code": 200
}
},
"jizo": {
"flow": {
"id": "1017644745558273"
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "http",
"transport": "TCP"
},
"observer": {
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "icc1"
}
}
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"10.20.30.101",
"203.176.135.102"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "10.20.30.101",
"bytes": 5427,
"ip": "10.20.30.101",
"packets": 8,
"port": 49778
},
"url": {
"original": "/libhtp::request_uri_not_seen",
"path": "/libhtp::request_uri_not_seen"
}
}
{
"message": " {\"timestamp\":\"2024-06-27T12:56:49.920281+0000\",\"flow_id\":1017644745558273,\"in_iface\":\"icc1\",\"event_type\":\"alert\",\"src_ip\":\"1.2.3.4\",\"src_port\":8000,\"dest_ip\":\"10.0.4.4\",\"dest_port\":4000,\"proto\":\"TCP\",\"alert\":{\"action\":\"allowed\",\"gid\":1,\"signature_id\":2221014,\"rev\":1,\"signature\":\"ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE Probe MS17-010 (Generic Flags)\",\"category\":\"A Network Trojan was detected\",\"severity\":3,\"metadata\":{\"affected_product\":[\"machine1\"],\"attack_target\":[\"Client_Endpoint\"],\"signature_severity\":[\"Major\"]}},\"app_proto\":\"smb\",\"flow\":{\"pkts_toserver\":4,\"pkts_toclient\":4,\"bytes_toserver\":265,\"bytes_toclient\":701,\"start\":\"2024-01-07T19:54:41.492407+0000\"}}",
"event": {
"action": "allowed",
"category": [
"network"
],
"kind": "alert",
"severity": 3,
"start": "2024-01-07T19:54:41.492407Z",
"type": [
"connection"
]
},
"@timestamp": "2024-06-27T12:56:49.920281Z",
"action": {
"properties": {
"category": "A Network Trojan was detected",
"severity": "Major",
"signature": "ET EXPLOIT Possible ETERNALBLUE Probe MS17-010 (Generic Flags)",
"signature_id": "2221014"
}
},
"destination": {
"address": "10.0.4.4",
"bytes": 701,
"ip": "10.0.4.4",
"packets": 4,
"port": 4000
},
"host": {
"ip": "1.2.3.4"
},
"jizo": {
"flow": {
"id": "1017644745558273"
}
},
"network": {
"protocol": "smb",
"transport": "TCP"
},
"observer": {
"ingress": {
"interface": {
"name": "icc1"
}
}
},
"related": {
"ip": [
"1.2.3.4",
"10.0.4.4"
]
},
"source": {
"address": "1.2.3.4",
"bytes": 265,
"ip": "1.2.3.4",
"packets": 4,
"port": 8000
}
}
Extracted Fields
The following table lists the fields that are extracted, normalized under the ECS format, analyzed and indexed by the parser. It should be noted that infered fields are not listed.
| Name | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
@timestamp |
date |
Date/time when the event originated. |
action.properties.category |
keyword |
|
action.properties.severity |
keyword |
|
action.properties.signature |
keyword |
|
action.properties.signature_id |
keyword |
|
destination.bytes |
long |
Bytes sent from the destination to the source. |
destination.ip |
ip |
IP address of the destination. |
destination.packets |
long |
Packets sent from the destination to the source. |
destination.port |
long |
Port of the destination. |
event.action |
keyword |
The action captured by the event. |
event.category |
keyword |
Event category. The second categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.kind |
keyword |
The kind of the event. The highest categorization field in the hierarchy. |
event.severity |
long |
Numeric severity of the event. |
event.start |
date |
event.start contains the date when the event started or when the activity was first observed. |
event.type |
keyword |
Event type. The third categorization field in the hierarchy. |
host.ip |
ip |
Host ip addresses. |
http.response.bytes |
long |
Total size in bytes of the response (body and headers). |
http.response.status_code |
long |
HTTP response status code. |
jizo.flow.id |
keyword |
|
network.protocol |
keyword |
Application protocol name. |
network.transport |
keyword |
Protocol Name corresponding to the field iana_number. |
observer.ingress.interface.name |
keyword |
Interface name |
source.bytes |
long |
Bytes sent from the source to the destination. |
source.ip |
ip |
IP address of the source. |
source.packets |
long |
Packets sent from the source to the destination. |
source.port |
long |
Port of the source. |
url.original |
wildcard |
Unmodified original url as seen in the event source. |
For more information on the Intake Format, please find the code of the Parser, Smart Descriptions, and Supported Events here.